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GISSEL PACKING COMPANY-THE NLRB
APPLIES THE STANDARDS*
LAWRENCE F. DOPPELT**
JEFFREY LADD***
AN EMPLOYER, CONFRONTED by a union demand for recognition
as representative of the employer's employees, may ordinarily insist
on a secret ballot election conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board' to determine whether or not the employees desire union rep-
resentation. 2  Even if the union has secured union authorization
cards signed by a majority of the employer's employees, 3 the em-
ployer generally need not recognize the union on the basis of the cards
alone. 4  NLRB secret ballot elections are the preferred method for
ascertaining a union's majority status, being more reliable than cards
for purposes of determining employee wishes. 5
In Gissel Packing Company,6 however, the Supreme Court severely
limited the employer's right to insist on such a secret ballot election in all
situations. It held the NLRB may order an employer to recognize and
bargain with a union having authorization cards7 from a majority of
the employer's employees if, after the union secures majority status,
* The authors express their appreciation to Jane Lizars, a student at the UiT-
Chicago Kent Law School, for permitting them to utilize certain results of a research
paper which she prepared on the subject topic.
** Associate Professor of Law, IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., 1956,
Northwestern University; J.D., 1959, Yale Law School. Field attorney and acting
supervisor with the NLRB, 1959-62. Thereafter engaged in the private practice of
law, specializing in labor-management relations.
Mr. Doppelt has written other articles in the field of labor relations.
• ** Student at IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Herein called the NLRB.
2. Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077 (1966).
3. Throughout this article, it is assumed the union is claiming representation for
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining, and
that such authorization cards as it secures are from the employees in such unit.
4. Briggs IGA Foodliner, 146 NLRB 443 (1964); Strydel, Inc., 156 NLRB
1185 (1966).
5. Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077 (1966).
6. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
7. Id. Authorization cards used to sustain a Gissel bargaining order generally
must unambiguously authorize the union to represent the employee in matters pertain-
ing to collective bargaining, and be secured without fraud, coercion, or serious misrep-
resentation. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 NLRB 1268 (1963), affd, 351 F.2d 917
(6th Cir. 1965).
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the employer engages in unfair labor practices8 having "the tendency
to undermine majority status and impede the election process."9  Such
an order may lie even if, at the time the bargaining order issues, the
union represents only a minority of the employees involved, having
lost its majority status in the interim period. The policy reasons for
the decision are obvious: an employer should not, by its own unfair
labor practices, be permitted to render a fair election impossible and
then demand that the question of union representation be decided by
an election.
The actual result of the Gissel decision is not substantially differ-
ent from what the NLRB and courts have been doing for years. As
long ago as 1943 the Supreme Court found that an employer, having
committed serious unfair labor practices, could be required to bargain
with a then minority union which had previously secured authoriza-
tion cards from a majority of the employees.1" Further, since 1949
the NLRB has held, in a long line of cases, that a bargaining order
may issue against an employer who in "bad faith" refused to recog-
nize a union having cards signed by a majority of its employees.
"Bad faith" was typically established by showing the employer com-
mitted serious unfair labor practices after it was aware of the union's
recognitional demands." Such an order could be required subse-
quent to the unfair labor practices even if the union no longer repre-
sented a majority of the employees. 2
However, while the Gissel result is basically in accord with prior
NLRB holdings, there is a distinct difference in determining whether
a bargaining order is appropriate under Gissel standards, as opposed
to those previously utilized by the NLRB. Before Gissel the NLRB
looked to the employer's motive in determining the propriety of a
bargaining order. If the employer's refusal to recognize a union hav-
ing cards signed by a majority of its employees was in "bad faith", a
bargaining order issued; if the refusal was in "good faith", no such
8. The unfair labor practices referred to herein would all be committed under
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, hereinafter called the Act.
9. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). Such an order
will issue as a remedy for the employer violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, which
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain" with a union
selected by a majority of its employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a) of the
Act. Section 8(d) of the Act defines the duty to bargain.
10. Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
11. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 (1949), af 'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. den., 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Traders Oil Co., 119 NLRB 746 (1957),
aff'd 263 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1959); Harrisburg Building Units, 116 NLRB 334 (1856).
12. Kickert Brothers Ford, Inc., 129 NLRB 1316 (1961).
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remedy was imposed.'" Certainly, the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices, or absence thereof, were indicia of the employer's intent, with
only serious unfair labor practices generally being sufficient to estab-
lish the requisite wrongful motive to warrant a bargaining order.14
Nevertheless, it was the employer's intent which was the controlling
factor in determining whether a bargaining order was appropriate.
Gissel, on the other hand, plows a different path, rendering the
employer's intent irrelevant in deciding whether a bargaining order
should issue. The effect of the employer's action is now the determina-
tive factor. If the employer's unfair labor practices are such that they
tend to undermine the union's majority status or disrupt the election
process, a bargaining order should issue. If the employer's actions
do not have such an effect, no such order is appropriate, even if the
employer acted in "bad faith". A Gissel remedy will or will not issue
depending on the effect of the employer's actions, regardless of in-
tent. 15
In so setting new standards, Gissel established two categories of
unfair labor practices to gauge the effect of employer actions and to
guide the NLRB in deciding whether a bargaining order should issue
thereunder. One category consists of wrongful employer acts which,
as noted, "have a tendency to undermine the union's majority strength
and impede the election process", 16 in which case a bargaining order
is proper. Unfair labor practices fall within this classification if, af-
ter taking into account their extensiveness and likely recurrence, "the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a
fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and . . .employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order.
7 . . The second category of unfair labor practices encompasses
those "minor or less extensive unfair labor practices"' 8 which will not
invoke a Gissel remedy. To fall within this classification employer
wrongful acts must have a "minimal impact"' 9 on the election proc-
ess. Ordinarily, a bargaining order should not, in any event, issue un-
13. See cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Aaron Bros., 158 NLRB 1077 (1966); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB (1949),
affd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. den., 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Hammond
& Irving, Inc., 154 NLRB 1071 (1965).
15. Cf. NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 92 S. Ct.
229 (1971).
16. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
17. Id. at 614, 615.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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less the union, at some point, secured cards signed by a majority ot
the employees.'
Predictably, the vague standards set by Gissel have presented the
NLRB with a challenge it is finding exceedingly difficult to meet. "No
recent decisional task has more perplexed (the NLRB) or confounded
the courts which review (NLRB) decisions, than that committed
to (the NLRB) in Gissel . . . to determine whether an order to bar-
gain is an appropriate remedy for employer interference. . .. "I' The
NLRB has clearly floundered over application of Gissel standards in
determining which types of employer actions will or will not warrant a
bargaining remedy. With this confusion has come a great degree of
uncertainty. Practitioners and persons in the field are hard-put to
foresee, with any accuracy, whether employer unfair labor practices
have the requisite effect warranting a bargaining order.
In order to establish some predictability in this area it has been
suggested that the NLRB establish specific guidelines setting forth
which practices will or will not call for a bargaining order.2 2  How-
ever, this is manifestly impractical. There are so many variations on in-
dividual types of unfair labor practices, and so many combinations there-
of, that it would be virtually impossible to foresee and set guidelines for
all, or substantially all, types of employer conduct. As soon as any
such guidelines were established, new or different combinations of un-
fair labor practices not covered thereby would surely be committed.
Labor relations, like life, "has relations not always capable of divi-
sion into inflexible compartments. The molds expand and shrink". 3
However, a substantial amount of time having passed since Gissel
and numerous decisions having been issued thereon by the NLRB, an
attempt may now be made to determine how the NLRB has cate-
gorized various employer unfair labor practices. An examination of
NLRB decisions will reveal that agency's thinking, to date at least, as
to which types of employer actions have the requisite effect under
Gissel standards so as to warrant a bargaining order. In this way a de-
gree of predictability may be brought to this troubled field.
Several caveats should be noted before examining the following
post-Gissel cases. First, emphasis throughout has been placed on what
20. Gissel establishes still a third category of unfair labor practices which are
rare and not herein discussed. This includes those wrongful actions which are so out-
rageous and pervasive that a bargaining order will issue even though the union never
enjoyed majority status.
21. General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972), dissenting opinion.
22. Id.
23. Mr. Justice Cardoza in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 241 (1922).
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the NLRB has done, not on what it has said, although some atten-
tion has necessarily been paid to the latter. NLRB utterances and
dicta in this area can be misleading, and any degree of certainty
can only be attained by searching actual results. Second, the basic
inquiry is to how the NLRB has acted, not to how it should have acted.
Although some suggestsions are advanced, particularly where there
are few cases on point, investigation is directed towards how the
NLRB has applied the Gissel standards, not to whether it has acted
properly. Finally, it is a truism that the NLRB is a political body.
Decisions will vary based on the individual predilections of the per-
sons making up the NLRB as a whole, or the particular panel hear-
ing a case.- Accordingly, conclusions herein set forth as to what the
NLRB has done are by no means conclusive as to what it will do.
A more "liberal" or "conservative" NLRB future makeup definitely
will affect the results of any particular case. However, it is assumed
that the NLRB is sufficiently judicious to recognize that persons in
the field do rely on NLRB past decisions for guidance. Disregard
thereof, without good reason, adversely affects both labor and manage-
ment and undermines confidence in the very processes of the NLRB.
Following, then, are cases showing how the NLRB has applied
the Gissel standards.2 5 They are broken down into individual types
of unfair labor practices and combinations thereof, establishing which
employer activities may, or may not, have the requisite Gissel effect so
that a bargaining order may be warranted.
1. THREATS OF REPRISALS AFFECTING JOB
SECURITY-STANDING ALONE
"A direct threat of loss of employment, whether through plant
closure, discharge, or layoff, is one of the most flagrant means by which
an employer can persuade employees from selecting a bargaining rep-
resentative. '20 Accordingly, such or similar threats have been construed
to warrant a bargaining order, even if made to relatively few em-
ployees, on the basis they are of "such gravity as to render a reliable
election unlikely...-.27
24. See Meltzer, Organization Picketing and The NLRB: Five On A Seesaw, 30
U. Chi. L. Rev. 78 (1962, 1963).
25. Only NLRB decisions are analyzed herein, court decisions applying Gissel
standards not being included. Further, in all cases cited the union, at some point, en-
joyed majority status based on union authorization cards.
26. General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972). Such threats constitute a
violation of Section 8 (a) ( 1 ) of the Act.
27. General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972). See also footnote 31 of
the Gissel decision, noting that threats to close or transfer operations are among the most
effective to destroy election conditions. Indeed, Gissel specifically held such a general
threat sufficient to invoke a bargaining remedy.
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However, there may be instances where a threat, standing alone,
is so isolated it will not have the requisite effect. If the employer can
prove such a threat was not taken seriously by the employees,2" or oc-
curred many months before an NLRB election could be held so that its
effects could be dissipated,2" a Gissel remedy may not be imposed.
Further, isolated threats by a first line supervisor, without authority to
carry them out, may not have the requisite effect when uttered as a
personal opinion in give and take sessions with employees.30 The
burden of proving that a serious threat affecting job security does
not have the effect of rendering a fair election unlikely rests heavily
upon the employer.31
2. ACTUAL REPRISALS AFFECTING JOB
SECURITY-STANDING ALONE
A discriminatory discharge or layoff of even one employee be-
cause of his union activities32 is generally sufficiently serious to warrant
a bargaining order, going, as it does, "to the very heart of the Act".83
When more than one employee in the unit involved is so discrimina-
torily discharged, the effect clearly calls for a Gissel remedy.3 4  Sim-
ilar reprisals, such as discriminatorily transferring employees out of the
unit to different jobs also warrants a bargaining order.35 And while
there are no cases on point, actual discriminatory plant closures, trans-
fers, subcontracts resulting in layoffs and the like, would certainly call
for a Gissel remedy under the rationale of the above cases.
In a dissenting opinion, Chairman Miller of the NLRB indicated
that the discriminatory discharge of one employee may not have the
requisite unlawful effect under Gissel if other employees did not suspect
28. Claremont Polychemical Corp., 196 NLRB No. 75 (1972). There was also
an isolated promise of promotion in this case, and the threat occurred five months be-
fore the election.
29. New Alaska Development, 194 NLRB No. 137 (1972), aff'd 441 F.2d 491
(7th Cir. 1971).
30. Stoutco, Inc., 180 NLRB 178 (1969).
31. General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972).
32. Such an action violates Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
33. A. J. Krajewski Mfg. Co., 180 NLRB 1071 (1970); Beverages, Inc., 182
NLRB 885 (1970).
34. Beach Mfg. Co., 192 NLRB No. 47 (1971), affd - F.2d - (6th Cir.
1972), 80 LRRM 3056; Welcome American Fertilizer Co., 179 NLRB 217 (1969),
rev'd - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1971), 77 LRRM 3007; Mansion House Center Manage-
ment Corp., 190 NLRB No. 78 (1971); Serbert Distributing Co., 187 NLRB No. 108
1971); Hilltop Van & Storage, 182 NLRB 1004 (1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.
1971).
35. Ship Shape Maintenance Co., Inc., 189 NLRB No. 58 (1971).
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the actual circumstances of the discharge.36  However, realities of indus-
trial relations render such a situation unlikely, as Chairman Miller ac-
knowledged, and there are no cases so holding.37 In any event, the bur-
den of proving that a discriminatory discharge does not warrant a bar-
gaining order should lie firmly with the employer.
3. THREATS OF REPRISALS AFFECTING WORKING
CONDITIONS-STANDING ALONE
Threats of reprisals affecting working conditions, 8 as opposed to
job security, will generally not give rise to a bargaining order. This
not only includes relatively minor threats, such as changing working
hours to interfere with outside part time employment,3 9 but also more
substantial actions, such as threatening to withdraw or renegotiate
existing or proposed benefits with a union, or to bargain from scratch.40
In any event, vague threats of reprisals or futility of bargaining which do
not affect job security will not ordinarily warrant a bargaining order41 by
themselves-the NLRB believing that employees "express little concern
over the possible loss of certain minor benefits ... "I'
4. ACTUAL REPRISALS AFFECTING WORKING
CONDITIONS-STANDING ALONE
Rather surprisingly, there seem to be no cases involving actual re-
prisals affecting working conditions standing alone, as opposed to job
security.43 As noted, infra, reprisals affecting working conditions are
usually combined with other wrongful activities.
36. General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972). Chairman Miller also
there stated that repeated discriminatory discharges would give rise to a bargaining
order.
37. One case where a discriminatory layoff of employees did not have the requi-
site Gissel effect occurred where: the employees were suspended for 4 hours; the rule
under which the employees were suspended was later revoked; and the employees were
paid back all monies lost. Central Soya of Canton, 180 NLRB 546 (1970).
38. Such threats are in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
39. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 177 NLRB 972 (1969). In this case there
was also an isolated minor promise of benefits, and still a bargaining order did not
issue.
40. Monroe, 190 NLRB No. 100 (1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1972);
Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB No. 56 (1970), where other unfair labor practices were
also involved and still a bargaining order did not issue; cf. General Stencils, Inc., 195
NLRB No. 173 (1972).
41. New Alaska Development Corp., 194 NLRB No. 137 (1972); Restaurant
Associates Industries, 194 NLRB No. 172 (1972).
42. General Stencils, 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972).
43. Such activities violate Section 8(a)(1) and, frequently, Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
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However, there is obviously a distinct difference between a threat,
to adversely affect an employee's working conditions, and actually do-
ing so. The former involves words which may or may not be taken ser-
iously. Indeed, such words almost fall into the class of "puffing"; the
sales pitch employers frequently give employees as to why they should
not join unions, and may be so interpreted by employees. Actual
reprisals, on the other hand, are a different story. An employee can-
not help but take these seriously, his working conditions having actually
been adversely affected. The employer has shown, in no uncertain
terms, who is "boss", and has exercised his economic power in the
most blatant manner. His fist is no longer in a "velvet glove".44
If there is an actual reprisal affecting working conditions which
go to the heart of the employer-employee relation, such as wage de-
creases, demotions, changes in significant working conditions, lessen-
ing of earnings opportunities, or the like, a guess may be hazarded
that a bargaining order should issue. On the other hand, less impor-
tant reprisals, such as changes in smoking regulations, eating privi-
leges, or work schedules may not, in themselves, be sufficient for a Gis-
sel remedy.45 Such lesser actions should not affect an employee to the
extent that his loyalties to the union or his ability to render a rational
election choice are irrevocably destroyed.
5. PROMISES OF BENEFITS-STANDING ALONE
Whether promises of benefits made to deter union organizational
efforts46 will by themselves warrant a bargaining order has not been
specifically decided. It appears that such will be determined by
the extent and nature of the promises. A promise affecting rela-
tively few employees, or of a minor or vague nature, will not invoke
such a remedy. 47 If, on the other hand, the employer solicits em-
ployee requests for what it will take to abandon the union, and then
promises substantial benefits pursuant thereto, a recognitional order
may be appropriate.48
44. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1963).
45. Cf. Blade Tribune Publishing, 180 NLRB 432 (1969).
46. Such actions are violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
47. Flight Safety, Inc., 197 NLRB No. 40 (1972); Poughkeepsie Newspapers,
Inc., 177 NLRB 972 (1969); Seymour Transfer, Inc., 179 NLRB 26 (1969); Blade
Tribune Publishing, 180 NLRB 432 (1969); Sinclair & Rush, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 9
(1970); American Leather & Suede Cleaners, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 95 (1971).
48. Cf. Freemont Newspapers, Inc., 179 NLRB 390 (1969), modified, 436 F.2d
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While the area of promises of benefits, standing alone, is basically
undecided, it is suggested that promises of substantial benefits, espec-
ially those affecting earnings opportunities and a substantial number
of employees, should call for a Gissel remedy. These are a clear abuse
of employer economic advantage, preventing employees from exercising
a free vote in an election. If the employee votes against the employer
he almost certainly loses promised benefits and charts an uncertain
course for his economic future. A vote for the employer, contrariwise,
assures him of almost certain increased economic opportunities. It
would take a strong employee to make an untrammelled choice under
such circumstances, the employer having used his economic leverage to
prevent a truly reasoned selection.
6. GRANTING OF BENEFITS--STANDING ALONE
As opposed to a promise of benefits, the actual granting of sub-
stantial benefits to more than an insignificant number of employees 49
in order to deter union organizational efforts will almost certainly in-
voke a bargaining order. 50 Although there is some contrary authority,,'
it has been noted that such a grant of significant benefits may, per se,
be sufficient to justify imposition of a Gissel remedy. 52 "The em-
ployer who identifies the sources of employee discontent, and reme-
dies them,. . . demonstrates by his action that he will oppose the union
by unlawful means and that employees who support it do so at their
grave peril."5 3
7. DOMINATING OR ASSISTING A RIVAL
UNION-STANDING ALONE
An employer's establishment of a company-dominated union or rec-
ognition of a minority union, in the face of organizational efforts by a
union having cards signed by a majority of employees should, in itself,
665 (8th Cir. 1970); Clark Sprague, 181 NLRB 624 (1970), modified, 440 F.2d 1099
(8th Cir. 1971 ), where other factors were also present.
49. Such an action would be violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
50. Escondido Ready Mix, 189 NLRB No. 69 (1971), affd, - F.2d -, 78
LRRM 2221 (9th Cir. 1971); Broad Street Hospital, 182 NLRB 307 (1970), a/i'd,
452 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1971); Tower Enterprises, 182 NLRB 382 (1970), a/I'd, -
F.2d -, 67 LC Par. 12453, 79 LRRM 2736 (9th Cir. 1972); cf. Texaco, Inc., 178
NLRB No. 72 (1969), a'd, 436 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971).
51. Arcoa Corp., 180 NLRB 1 (1969); Monroe, 190 NLRB No. 100 (1971), rev'd,
460 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1972); Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB No. 56 (1970).
52. General Stencils, 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
53. Id.; see also International Harvester, 179 NLRB 753 (1969); Soil Mechanics,
233 DLR E-1 (Dec., 1972).
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warrant a bargaining order.54 The establishment or recognition of such
a "sweetheart" union would render a fair election or continuing loyalties
to the majority union virtually impossible. Once the minority union
were recognized, employee reliance would be indefinitely trans-
ferred thereto. Employees would necessarily look to the assisted or
dominated organization for economic betterment, making it exceed-
ingly unlikely that the majority union could regain or retain their al-
legiance. A fair election could scarcely be contemplated under such
circumstances.
The above analysis should not necessarily apply to minor viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Permitting a favored rival union
to address or solicit employees while denying such rights to a majority
union, for example, should not result in a bargaining order, particu-
larly if other avenues of access are available for employee solicita-
tion. 5 Clearly, such violations could be remedied by more tradi-
tional routes, and employee loyalties would not be irrevocably affected.
8. OTHER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES-STANDING ALONE
Except as otherwise noted above, other individual types of unfair
labor practices standing alone will generally not be sufficient to im-
pose a bargaining order on an employer. Most significantly, this in-
cludes coercive interrogation, 6 either isolated or systematic.17  It also
applies to 58 physically or verbally abusing an outside union organizer
in the presence of employees,5 9 unlawfully prohibiting the wearing of
union buttons, 60 wrongfully utilizing an employee to convey the em-
54. Cf. Leslie Metal Arts Co., 194 NLRB No. 20 (1971), where the employer
established a dominated employee committee, and also threatened unfavorable working
conditions to defeat a union; also Overland Distributing Centers, Inc., 194 NLRB
No. 113 (1971), where the employer also interrogated one employee, an obviously minor
unfair labor practice. Sturgeon Electric, 181 NLRB 157 (1970), where the employer,
confronted by one union's demand, gave support to another union. Such employer
action assisting, dominating or forming a labor organization violates Section 8(a)(1)
and (2) of the Act.
55. Cf. Englebert Samide, 181 NLRB 761 (1970).
56. Such interrogation violates Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
57. Action Advertising Co., 195 NLRB No. 122 (1972); Kohl Motors, Inc., 185
NLRB No. 69 (1970); Arcoa Corp., 180 NLRB 1 (1970), where other unfair labor
practices were also involved; Bill Pierre Ford, Inc., 181 NLRB 929 (1970); Blade
Tribune Publishing, 180 NLRB 432 (1969), also involving other types of unfair labor
practices.
58. The following unfair labor practices involve Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In
all cases cited, there were also other unfair labor practices in addition to those indicated.
Since no bargaining order issued when the noted practices were accompanied by other
wrongful acts, clearly none would issue for such improper activities standing alone.
59. Schrementi Bros., Inc., 179 NLRB 853 (1969).
60. Central Soya of Canton, Inc., 180 NLRB 546 (1970).
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ployer's displeasure with the union, 61 and soliciting an employee to
feel out fellow employees as to their union activities.62 While there
are no cases, unlawful surveillance or nonsolicitation rules,63 standing
alone, would appear to be in the same class as the foregoing violations,
and would not warrant a Gissel remedy. Manifestly, they would not
affect a majority status already achieved, or render a fair election un-
likely.
9. THREATS OF REPRISALS AFFECTING WORKING CONDITIONS
TOGETHER WITH PROMISES OF BENEFITS
As noted, neither threats of reprisals affecting working condi-
tions, as opposed to job security, nor isolated promises of benefits,
standing alone, will call for a bargaining order. And, although there
are too few cases to form a firm prediction, it appears the combination
of such conduct will not necessarily warrant a Gissel remedy. 6"
Contrary to the above conclusion, however, are the realities of
employer-employee relations. Standing together, threats of reprisals
and promises of benefits paint a picture to employees of an employer
determined to destroy a union's majority status, and willing to use se-
riously improper means to do so. Thus, in concert, they may well have
a cumulative effect of destroying a unions majority status or rendering
a fair election unlikely." In any event, it seems clear it would not take
too much more, together with such combination, to call for a bargaining
order.66
10. THREATS OF REPRISALS AFFECTING WORKING CONDITIONS
TOGETHER WITH OTHER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES NOT
THEMSELVES WARRANTING A BARGAINING ORDER
Threats of reprisals affecting working conditions, as opposed to
job security, do not ordinarily result in a Gissel remedy. 7 This contin-
61. J. A. Conley, 181 NLRB 123 (1970).
62. Sinclair & Rush, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 9 (1970).
63. Both activities violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
64. Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB No. 56 (1970); Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc.,
177 NLRB 972 (1969); Restaurant Associates, 194 NLRB No. 172 (1972).
65. Merritt Motors, 181 NLRB 1099 (1970).
66. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 194 NLRB No. 132 (1971), aII'd, 80
LRRM 2902 (4th Cir. 1972), involving threats of reduced benefits and earnings, and
promises to correct grievances, together with surveillance and interrogation; Renner
Plumbing, 179 NLRB 642 (1969), af'd, 437 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1971), involving
threats of reprisals basically affecting working conditions, vague promises of benefits,
and interrogation.
67. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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ues to be the case even where they are accompanied by other unfair
labor practices which do not themselves warrant a bargaining order; 8
such as interrogation.69
It should be questioned whether this should be the result where
there are various other unfair labor practices accompanying threats of
reprisals. The cumulative effect of such concerted practices may well
have the same coercive effect as a more serious unfair labor prac-
tice standing alone. The impact of an employer embarking on a series
of unlawul activities, however minor each may be individually, will
certainly have an effect well beyond what each alone might cause.7"
The employees will get the employer's message loud and clear: adher-
ence to the union may invoke the employer's wrath.
11. PROMISES OF BENEFITS TOGETHER WITH OTHER
MINOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Promises of benefits which, standing alone, will not invoke a bar-
gaining order, will not necessarily do so when combined with other
minor unfair labor practices, such as interrogation or solicitation of an
employee to query his fellow employees as to their union affiliation."'
Where, however, there are a number of minor unfair labor practices,
combined with a promise of benefits, the cumulative effect may be
such as to warrant a bargaining order. 72
12. THREATS OF REPRISALS AFFECTING JOB SECURITY
COMBINED WITH MINOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A threat of reprisal affecting job security will ordinarily call for a
Gissel remedy.73 Combined with other unfair labor practices, even
the most minor, there is little doubt such a remedy is warranted.74
When the additional unfair labor practices are something more than
68. Hereinafter, unfair labor practices not themselves warranting a bargaining
order may be referred to as "minor" unfair labor practices.
69. New Alaska Development Corp., 194 NLRB No. 137 (1972).
70. Cf. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals, 189 NLRB No. 95 (1971).
71. Sinclair & Rush, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 9 (1970); Blade Tribune Publishing,
180 NLRB 432 (1969).
72. Cf. Ingress Plastene, Inc., 177 NLRB 481 (1969).
73. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
74. Irv's Market, 179 NLRB 832 (1969), affd, 434 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1970),
threats of store closure combined with interrogation: General Steel Products, 180
NLRB 56 (1969), threats of discharge and other dire events combined with interroga-
tion; Dayton Town & Country, 179 NLRB 847 (1969), afI'd, 445 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir. 1971), threat of discharge plus interrogation; Lil General Stores, 188 NLRB No.
117 (1971), threats of discharge, interrogation and impression of surveillance; General
Stencils, 195 NLRB No. 173 (1972), threats of layoffs, interrogation and surveillance.
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minor, but perhaps less than those requiring a bargaining order on their
own, a bargaining remedy will, of course, issue.75
13. ACTUAL REPRISALS AFFECTING JOB SECURITY TOGETHER
WITH I 4NOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
An actual reprisal against employees for engaging in union activi-
ties being a practice which will invoke a bargaining order,'7 6 it follows
that such action, together with either minor7 1 or more extensive unfair
labor practices which do not themselves warrant a bargaining order, 78
will result in a Gissel remedy.
75. Essex Wire, 188 NLRB No. 59 (1970), modified, - F.2d -, 80 LRRM 3166
(6th Cir. 1972), threat of job and benefit loss and interrogation; Arbie Mineral Feed,
182 NLRB 146 (1970), modified, 438 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971), threats of discharge
and lost benefits and interrogation; Production Industries, Inc., 178 NLRB 706 (1969),
a!i'd, 425 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1970), threats of job loss, promise of benefits and inter-
rogation; Red & White Super Market, 179 NLRB 831 (1969), threats to close business,
promises of benefits, interrogation, and surveillance; Tri County Tube, Inc., 194 NLRB
No. 5 (1971), threat of plant shutdown and reprisals, promise of benefits; Bancroft
Mfg., 189 NLRB No. 60 (1971), threat of closure, interrogation, participating in anti-
union petition, sponsoring pro-employer badges; U-Tote-M of Oklahoma, 179 NLRB 829
(1969), threat of closure, interrogation, offering employees independent contractor sta-
tus; Coca Cola Bottling, 188 NLRB No. 91 (1971), threat of layoffs, promise of bene-
fits, interrogation; Solvay Baking Co., 180 NLRB 418 (1969), threats, interrogation,
soliciting direct employee contact over grievances; Pure Chem. Co., 192 NLRB No. 88
(1971), threat of plant removal, promise of benefits, interrogation; Mid-Missouri Mo-
tors, 194 NLRB No. 79 (1971), threats affecting security and job safety, soliciting
employees to abandon strike, and union, interrogation; World Carpets, Inc., 176 NLRB
No. 138 (1969), threat of job loss, promise of benefits; Riviera Manor Nursing Home,
186 NLRB No. 113 (1971), threats of discharge, promise of benefits, interrogation;
Overmeyer Co., 190 NLRB No. 71 (1971), threats of discharge and physical harm,
interrogation, reprisals, promise of benefits; Stanley Air Tools, 179 NLRB 553 (1969),
aff'd, 432 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1970), threats of discharge and reduced benefits, inter-
rogation, soliciting membership revocations; Thrift Drugs of Penn., 179 NLRB 827
(1969), threats of closure, promise of increases, interrogation, surveillance, threat of re-
prisals, determination not to hire pro-union adherents; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
194 NLRB No. 132 (1971), affd, - F.2d -, 68 LC Par. 12770, 80 LRRM 2902
(4th Cir. 1972), threats of loss of full time opportunities, promise to correct grievances,
interrogation, surveillance, threat of other reprisals.
76. Supra, section 4 of the text.
77. Cornelius American, Inc., 194 NLRB No. 154 (1972), discharge plus inter-
rogation; United Electric Co., 194 NLRB No. 105 (1971), discharge plus interrogation;
S. E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 179 NLRB 249 (1969), discharge, interrogation, surveillance,
solicitation to withdraw from union; Vars Buick Corp., 180 NLRB 626 (1970), dis-
charge plus interrogation; Walker Co., 183 NLRB No. 136 (1970), discharge, in-
terrogation.
78. Zermuhlen & Associates, 189 NLRB No. 63 (1971), discharge, threats of
reprisals affecting working conditions, interrogation; Atlas Engine Works, Inc., 181
NLRB 52 (1970), aff'd, 435 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1970), discriminatory refusal to re-
hire, threat of benefit loss, impression of surveillance, interrogation, unlawful no-
solicitation rule; Amsterdam Wrecking, 196 NLRB No. 18 (1972), discharge of union
adherents, threat to withhold benefits, interrogation; Acker Industries, 184 NLRB No.
51 (1970), rev'd, - F.2d -, 68 LC Par. 12688, 80 LRRM 2364 (10th Cir. 1972),
discharge plus promise of benefits; General Plastics, 188 NLRB No. 111 (1971), ajfd,
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14. GRANTING OF BENEFITS TOGETHER WITH
MINOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Since the granting of substantial benefits to deter employees from
engaging in the union activities is enough to warrant a bargaining or-
der,7" such action combined with other unfair labor practices considered
minor will generally result in a Gissel remedy.80 The one contrary case
is difficult to reconcile with the above conclusion.81
15. HODGEPODGE
While an attempt has been made herein to categorize and pigeon-
hole types of unfair labor practices to ascertain whether they meet
Gissel standards, it should be recognized that, with certain exceptions,
there are few black and white areas. In most cases, more than one
type of unfair labor practice has been committed, and the combinations
of wrongful acts is almost infinite. However, from what has already
been noted, and to further guide practitioners and parties in this area,
bargaining orders will properly issue in the following melange of situa-
tions:8 2
a. Threats of plant closures or job loss to even a few employ-
ees and discriminatory reprisals affecting job security, combined with
various minor unfair labor practices, such as interrogation, threats of
- F.2d -, 80 LRRM 2112 (5th Cir. 1972), discharge, interrogation, surveillance,
offer of better jobs; Sitton Tank Co., 193 NLRB No. 3 (1972), discriminatory layoffs,
interrogation, promise of benefits; Colonial Lincoln-Mercury Sales, 197 NLRB No. 31
(1972), discharge, work rule reprisals, interrogation, refusal to reinstate strikers; May
& Bigley, 178 NLRB 653 (1969), discharge, threat of discharge and closure, denial of
benefits, surveillance, threats of futility of unionization; Copps Corp., 181 NLRB 294
(1970), modified, 458 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1972), discharge, threats to reduce hours,
threat of layoffs and warning not to attend union meeting, promise of benefits, inter-
rogation, solicitation of employees for surveillance; Dawson Metal Products, 183 NLRB
1268 (1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1971), discriminatory failure to hire, prom-
ises, interrogation, threats of reprisals.
79. Supra, section 6 of the text.
80. Escondido Ready Mix, 189 NLRB No. 69 (1971), granting of benefits com-
bined with offer to deal directly with employees; WKRG-TV, 190 NLRB No. 34
(1971), granting of benefits, with interrogation, nonsolicitation rule; Texaco, Inc.,
178 NLRB 434 (1969), granting of benefits, interrogation; C&G Electric, 180 NLRB
No. 52 (1969), granting of benefits, plus interrogation; Hy-Vee Food Stores, 178 NLRB
609 (1969), a! 'd, 426 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1970), granting of benefits, combined with
threats to adversely affect promotional opportunities and interrogation. Levi Strauss,
180 NLRB No. 43 (1969), affd, 441 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1970), granting of bene-
fits combined with threat of loss of benefits, interrogation, and nonsolicitation rule.
81. Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB No. 56 (1970), where soliciting and rectifying
grievances was combined with threats that each benefit would have to be renegotiated
anew with the union.
82. Cases where bargaining orders will not issue have been discussed, supra
note 78.
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reprisals or reprisals affecting working conditions, promises of bene-
fits, and/or surveillance; 8
b. Illegally assisting a rival union in recognizing it, rather than
the majority union, and discriminatory discharges;"4
c. Granting of benefits, threats of reprisals affecting job secur-
ity, and actual reprisals affecting job security, together with minor un-
fair labor practices such as interrogation, threats of reprisals affecting
working conditions, promises of benefits, surveillance, and/or no
solicitation rules; 5
d. Granting of benefits and actual reprisals affecting job secur-
ity, together with other minor unfair labor practices such as interro-
gation, promise of benefits, and/or surveillance; 6
e. Granting of benefits and threats of reprisals affecting job se-
83. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 177 NLRB 113 (1969); V. H. Industries, Inc.,
177 NLRB 929 (1969), aff'd, 433 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1970); Marie Phillips, Inc., 178
NLRB 340 (1969), aird, 443 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morrison Cafeteria, 179
NLRB 593 (1969), affd, 449 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1971); Diamond Standard Fuel
Corp., 179 NLRB 702 (1969), aff'd, 437 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1971); Wilson Furniture,
181 NLRB 54 (1970); Transport, Inc., 181 NLRB 478 (1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 193
(8th Cir. 1971); American Door Co., 181 NLRB 37 (1970); Breezeway Foods, Inc.,
183 NLRB No. 92 (1970); Acker Industries, 184 NLRB No. 51 (1970), cert. denied,
- F.2d -, LC Par. 12688 (10th Cir. 1972), involving a threat of closure and dis-
criminatory discharges and failure to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers); Sayer's
Printing Co., 185 NLRB No. 120 (1970), modified, 453 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1971);
Medley Distilling, 187 NLRB No. 12 (1970), afi'd, 453 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1971);
Zurmuhlen & Associates, Morie Precision, 190 NLRB No. 25 (1971); Air Trans-
port Equipment, 190 NLRB No. 69 (1971); Paschall Truck Lines, 190 NLRB No.
108 (1971); E. L. Jones Dodge, Inc., 190 NLRB No. 136 (1971); Bob White
Target, 189 NLRB No. 128 (1971); Laurels Hotel and Country Club, 178 NLRB 705
(1969); Quality Rubber Mfg. Co., 178 NLRB 711 (1969); Steele Apparel, 179 NLRB
218 (1969), modified, 437 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1971); The Kostel Corp., 179 NLRB
730 (1969), modified, 440 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1971); Pirolli & Sons, Inc., 194 NLRB
No. 37 (1971); City and County Sewer Service, 191 NLRB No. 27 (1971); W. T.
Grant, 195 NLRB No. 183 (1972); Harper Truck Services, 196 NLRB No. 43 (1972);
Beaver Brothers Baking Co., 182 NLRB 861 (1970); Ace Foods, Inc., 192 NLRB No.
80 (1971); Atlanta Daily World, 179 NLRB 999 (1969); Davis Wholesale, 181 NLRB
1 (1970).
84. Centac Corp., 179 NLRB 313 (1969).
85. Airline Parking, Inc., 196 NLRB No. 154 (1972); Starward Fabrics, Inc.,
190 NLRB No. 97 (1971); All-Tronics, Inc., 179 NLRB 138 (1969); City Welding
& Mfg. Co., 191 NLRB No. 30 (1971), ajf'd, - F.2d -, 68 LC Par. 12869, 80 LRRM
3057 (3rd Cir. 1972); Mechanical Specialties, 179 NLRB 676 (1969); R. D. Cortina
Co., Inc., 179 NLRB 701 (1969), a! 'd, - F.2d -, 66 LC Par. 12167, 78 LRRM
2479 (2nd Cir. 1971); J. P. Stevens, 179 NLRB 254 (1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 514 (5th
Cir. 1971); Tri-State Stores, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 117 (1970), where there was also a
unilateral reduction in the work week.
86. Hancock Fabric Outlet, 179 NLRB 639 (1969), af 'd, - F.2d -, 64 LC Par.
11504 (1970); Atlantic Steamers Supply, 188 NLRB No. 40 (1971); Garland Knitting
Mills, 178 NLRB 396 (1969); M. H. Brown Co., 179 NLRB 889 (1969), rev'd, 441
F.2d 839 (2nd Cir. 1971).
87. Mr. Wicke Co., Ltd., 182 NLRB 38 (1970).
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curity, either alone 7 or together with other unfair labor practices, such
as threats of reprisals affecting working conditions, interrogations,
and/or promise of benefits;8
f. Threats of discharge and physical harm, withdrawing em-
ployee washroom privileges, promising benefits, offering individual
contracts to employees, and interrogation;89
g. Illegally assisting and recognizing a dominated labor organ-
ization, interrogation, threats of loss of benefits, and contracting with
the minority union;90
h. Illegally forming a company-dominated union, together with
granting benefits, interrogation, and threats of reprisals affecting job se-
curity;91
i. Unlawful change of working conditions, threats of discharge,
interrogation and promise of benefits; 92
j. Unlawful discharge, dominating and assisting a union, inter-
rogation, promise of benefits.9 3
k. Coercively interrogating and polling employees and creating
an impression of surveillance against a background of widespread
company hostility to unionization and prior flagrant unlawful prac-
tices at other company facilities. 94
The above cannot, and is not meant to be exhaustive of Gissel
cases. It does, however, categorize the most typical types of cases
with which the NLRB has been confronted, and demonstrates how Gis-
sel standards have been applied by that agency in the past. Insofar
as precedent may be a guide to the future, it may shed some light for
practitioners in the field as to how the NLRB may be expected to pro-
ceed.
A final note is in order based on a recent article questioning
whether an employer's pre-election campaigning has a real impact on
how employees vote in an election. 95  It is the preliminary conclu-
88. Fresno Macaroni Mfg. Co., Inc., 191 NLRB No. 21 (1971); Great Plains
Steel Corp., 183 NLRB No. 96 (1970); United Packing Co. of Iowa, Inc., 187 NLRB
No. 132 (1971).
89. Overmeyer Co., 190 NLRB No. 71 (1971).
90. The Bescome Distributors Corp., 179 NLRB 787 (1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d
1312 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. Triggs-Miner Corp., 180 NLRB 206 (1969).
92. The Dalf Corp., 188 NLRB No. 57 (1971).
93. Henry Colder Co., 181 NLRB 320 (1970).
94. Hecks, Inc., 181 NLRB 847 (1970).
95. Getman, Goldberg and Herman, The National Labor Relations Board Voting
Study: A Preliminary Report, Reprint Series No. 224, Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations, University of Illinois Bulletin (1972).
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sion of the article that the specific content of the campaign is gener-
ally irrelevant in shaping voting behavior. The article suggests that the
employees consciously, or subconsciously, have determined how they will
vote in advance of any campaigning, based on their pre-existing pre-
dilections for or against unionization.
While the implications of the above study are admittedly pre-
liminary, it is not believed the results are wholly valid for the follow-
ing reasons. First, it is not in accordance with the realities of in-
dustrial relations. It is not at all uncommon that a large majority of
employees sign cards for a union, and then vote against the union
after intensive pre-election employer campaigning. While some of
the vote switchers may well have signed cards because of social or
other pressures, it is unlikely that most did so for that reason. Employer
pressures are equal to those generated by the union and these are consid-
ered when an employee determines whether or not to sign a card.
Were an election to be held immediately after the majority of employees
signed cards, but before any employer campaigning, it is likely that the
affirmative action of signing a union card would be carried forward into
the voting booth. Therefore, the switch in voting can only be explained
by the employer's pre-election conduct.
Second, even if, as the above article indicates, as many as 80
per cent of the employees have determined how to vote in advance of
pre-election campaigning there would still remain 20 per cent of the
voters who are undecided. The vote of this remaining bloc may well
determine the outcome of the election. It is to this group of unde-
cided voters that the parties direct their pre-election campaigning. To
conclude that this group is unaffected by threats, promises and other
coercive activity is hard to believe. After all, when an employee is told
his future economic livelihood depends on the outcome of an elec-
tion, he will not ignore what he is hearing.
Accordingly, and with respect to the aforementioned article, it is
believed that the implied conclusions therein, namely, that a Gissel-
type remedy is not required when employer pre-election conduct se-
riously affects the results of an election, is not in accord with the realities
of industrial relations. It would appear that Gissel will, and should, re-
main in effect as a viable method for curing certain types of employer
unfair labor practices.
